A new approach to gauging inflation expectations by Joseph G. Haubrich
ECONOMIC COMMENTARY August 2009
A New Approach to Gauging 
Inﬂ  ation Expectations 
Joseph G. Haubrich
This Economic Commentary explains a relatively new method of uncovering inﬂ  ation expectations, real interest rates, 
and an inﬂ  ation-risk premium. It provides estimates of expected inﬂ  ation from one month to 30 years, an estimate of 
the inﬂ  ation-risk premium, and a measure of real interest rates, particularly a short (one-month) rate, which is not readily 
available from the TIPS market. Calculations using the method suggest that longer-term inﬂ  ation expectations remain 
near historic lows. Furthermore, the inﬂ  ation-risk premium is also low, which in the model means that inﬂ  ation is not 
expected to deviate far from expectations.
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Policymakers at the Federal Reserve and other central 
banks continually face the “Goldilocks” question—is 
monetary policy too tight, too loose, or just right? It would 
help if the central bank knew what real interest rates and 
expected inﬂ  ation actually were, but these are not easy to 
observe. Visible indicators of these factors, such as Treasury 
inﬂ  ation-protected securities (TIPS), survey measures of 
expected inﬂ  ation, and nominal interest rates, are useful, 
but none of them alone quite tells the whole story. Nominal 
interest rates change with both real rates and expected inﬂ  a-
tion, survey measures ask about only a few horizons, and 
measures of inﬂ  ation expectations coming from inﬂ  ation-
protected securities conﬂ  ate expectations with risk premia. 
Uncovering a purer measure is possible, but it takes a care-
ful combination of the available data and the application of 
economic theory. 
This Economic Commentary explains a relatively new method 
of uncovering inﬂ  ation expectations and real interest rates 
and describes what light those numbers can shed on the 
current status of the U.S. economy. 
People’s expectation of inﬂ  ation enters into nearly every 
economic decision they make. It enters into large deci-
sions: whether they can afford a mortgage payment on a 
new house, whether they strike for higher wages, how they 
invest their retirement funds. It also enters into the smaller 
decisions, that, in the aggregate, affect the entire economy: 
whether they wait for the milk to go on sale or buy it before 
the price goes up.
Real interest rates also play a key role in many economic 
decisions. When businesses invest—or don’t—in plants 
and equipment, when families buy—or don’t—a new car 
or dishwasher, they are making judgments about the real 
return on the object and the real cost of borrowing. As such, 
real interest rates can be an important guide to monetary 
policy. As Alan Greenspan once explained,1 keeping the real 
rate around its equilibrium level (which is determined by 
economic and ﬁ  nancial conditions), has a “stabilizing effect 
on the economy” and it helps direct production “toward its 
long-term potential.”
Modeling Interest Rates
For economists, a model is not a toy train or runway star, 
but rather, a simpliﬁ  ed description of reality, usually involv-
ing equations. It’s a way to describe how the parts of the 
world (or at least the ﬁ  nancial markets) ﬁ  t together. Our 
new approach to estimating inﬂ  ation expectations starts with 
a model of real and nominal interest rates—in effect making 
assumptions and writing down equations that purport to de-
scribe how interest rates and inﬂ  ation move over time.2 The 
model has two key parts. The ﬁ  rst describes how short-term 
real interest rates and inﬂ  ation move over time. The model 
has to capture movements of short-term rates accurately in 
order to describe the behavior of all interest rates accurately: 
if short-term rates rise, do they stay high or quickly fall; do 
they move smoothly or take a few big jumps? The second 
part of the model describes how those movements in short-
term rates and inﬂ  ation build up and determine longer-term 
interest rates and expectations. 
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are tied to shorter rates in two ways, and the model reﬂ  ects 
both. The ﬁ  rst and most inﬂ  uential determinant of long-
term rates is market expectations of future short rates. 
Investing in a two-year bond is a lot like investing in two 
one-year bonds back to back: one now and another one a 
year later. The yields shouldn’t get too far out of line. But 
because those two investments are not quite identical, long-
term rates are also determined in part by something else. Be-
cause of risk, because investors don’t know what rates will 
be next year—longer-term bonds embed a term premium in 
their rates, a risk factor that makes long-term rates different 
from the average of expected future short rates.
This means that the model also has to describe how inves-
tors incorporate risk into interest rates. This has two parts. 
One has to do with capturing the amount of risk perceived 
to exist, which is in effect, capturing how variable short-term 
rates and inﬂ  ation are, and the other has to do with estimat-
ing the prices of those risks. These considerations introduce 
several new factors into the model, including separate vari-
ability measures for inﬂ  ation and interest rates, and, because 
investors might feel differently about variability in interest 
rates and inﬂ  ation, separate prices of risk. 
The model also needs to match two ways of looking at the 
data on interest rates and expectations of inﬂ  ation. One is 
the “time series” way—how a speciﬁ  c interest or expected in-
ﬂ  ation rate varies over time. The other is the “cross-section” 
approach, which at any given date (say June 2, 1995) lists 
the “term structure” of rates at one month, three months, 
one year, and so forth. An accurate model matches both 
the time-series side (how rates change over time) and the 
cross-section side (the pattern of long and short rates at any 
given time). Put another way, the guess about how expected 
inﬂ  ation moves over time must also be consistent with the 
relationship between long and short rates. For example, if 
inﬂ  ation is very persistent, then seeing a high inﬂ  ation rate 
today implies nominal long-term interest rates should also 
be high, as they embed the inﬂ  ation that is expected to 
continue. 
The next step is to “calibrate” the model, which involves 
tweaking some key numbers in the equations until the mod-
el produces results that match actual data. Some examples of 
these key numbers—parameters, in economists’ jargon—for 
the time series side are numbers describing things like how 
variable and persistent short-term real rates and inﬂ  ation 
expectations are, and how large the price of risk is for both 
real rates and inﬂ  ation. The calibration is done through a 
statistical analysis (in a rather complicated way we won’t 
go into here). It’s like calibrating a speedometer: once you 
measure the readings on a course you know, you can trust 
the reading in other situations.
In our case, the model gives predictions for nominal rates 
and inﬂ  ation expectations derived from inﬂ  ation swaps, and 
the parameters are moved around until predictions look sim-
1. Expected Inﬂ  ation
Note: As of September 1, 2009.
Source: Author’s calculations.
2. Ten-Year Expected Inﬂ  ation and 
Inﬂ  ation-Risk Premium
Note: As of September 1, 2009.
Source: Haubrich, Pennachi, and Ritchken (2008).
3. Real Interest Rate
Note: As of September 1, 2009.
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match the yields on Treasury securities from three months 
to 15 years. It matches expectations of inﬂ  ation coming from 
three different sources: Blue Chip economic forecasts, which 
are short-term expectations of inﬂ  ation over the next several 
quarters; the forecasts of the Survey of Professional Fore-
casters (SPF), which are opinions on inﬂ  ation over the next 
10 years; and inﬂ  ation swaps (a ﬁ  nancial derivative in which 
investors swap a ﬁ  xed payment for payments based on the 
CPI), which run the gamut from one to 30 years. Knowing 
there is a close match on rates we can observe, such as ac-
tual interest rates and inﬂ  ation, we are more conﬁ  dent about 
what the model tells us about things that we can’t observe, 
such as risk factors and expectations over horizons that the 
surveys did not ask about. 
Lessons
In a way, the story so far has been all about sharpening the 
knife. Now is the time to cut something with it. So what 
does the model tell us? 
It provides estimates of expected inﬂ  ation from one  ￿ 
month to 30 years.
It provides an estimate of the inﬂ  ation-risk premium. ￿ 
It provides a measure of real interest rates, particularly  ￿ 
a short (one-month) rate, not readily available from the 
TIPS market.
Expected Inﬂ  ation
Figure 1 shows inﬂ  ation expectations at an annual horizon 
of three months to 30 years. Despite a somewhat high one-
month expectation of 4 percent, expectations rapidly return 
to the neighborhood of 2 percent, showing only a gradual 
increase after ﬁ  ve years. In the short run, it is common for 
inﬂ  ation to ﬂ  uctuate, particularly since Blue Chip, the SPF, 
and inﬂ  ation swaps base their expectations on the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI), not any of the more stable inﬂ  ation mea-
sures such as the core, the median, or the trimmed-mean 
CPI. Big shifts in oil, gas, and food often lead to big month-
to-month changes in the CPI, which often average out over 
the longer term. From the standpoint of the central bank, it 
is the longer-term trend that matters: Monetary policy deter-
mines inﬂ  ation over the long haul, but it has little effect on 
price changes stemming from a poor harvest or a strike in 
the oil ﬁ  elds. Figure 1 shows that inﬂ  ation expectations settle 
down after about two years; this suggests that the Federal 
Reserve still has credibility in keeping inﬂ  ation low and that 
the massive increase in its balance sheet and the accompany-
ing increase in banking system reserves has not served to 
unanchor the public’s expectations of inﬂ  ation.
Inﬂ  ation-Risk Premium 
A key advantage of using this model is the ability to split 
out inﬂ  ation expectations from the inﬂ  ation-risk premium. 
Figure 2 plots them both for the 10-year horizon. There 
are three things to note in this ﬁ  gure. First, it documents 
the long, slow effort to wring out inﬂ  ation psychology from 
the public: It took about 20 years for inﬂ  ation expectations to 
drop from over 6 percent to around 2 percent, where they have 
held roughly steady for the past six years. Implicit in this is the 
second point, that current expectations of longer-term inﬂ  ation 
are near historically low levels, though up a bit from earlier this 
year. Finally, the inﬂ  ation-risk premium is rather low and quite 
steady. 
Finding the inﬂ  ation-risk premium is particularly important 
because it addresses the accuracy of the so-called “break-even” 
measures of inﬂ  ation expectations (“break-even” because inves-
tors break even on their returns if inﬂ  ation is as expected). 
These break-even rates come from ﬁ  nancial markets, either as 
the difference between the interest rate on nominal Treasury 
bonds, which are not protected against inﬂ  ation, and TIPS, 
which are, or from inﬂ  ation swaps, where one party makes a 
ﬁ  xed payment to receive a payment indexed to the CPI. The 
problem is that the break-even rate includes a risk premium. 
This risk premium means that the break-even rate overstates 
expected inﬂ  ation and that changes in the break-even rate might 
arise from changes in the risk premium, not changes in expected 
inﬂ  ation. 
The inﬂ  ation-risk premium averages around one-half of a per-
cent for most of the period. It also varies only between 
29 and 61 basis points, effectively keeping between one-third 
and two-thirds of a percent over the 27-year period. Such a low 
and steady level means that outside of special periods, such as 
the present, break-even inﬂ  ation rates provide a reasonable mea-
sure of expected inﬂ  ation. The dominant portion of the break-
even rate, and by far the largest changes, come from the expec-
tations, not the risk premium. So in most instances, a change 
in the break-even rate can safely be attributed to a change in 
expectations. In the end, the model ends up supporting the case 
for using TIPS as a gauge of inﬂ  ation expectations.
Short-Term Real Rate
TIPS provide a direct measure of real interest rates, but 
most TIPS are long-term, issued only in maturities of 5, 10, or 
20 years. As time passes, of course, their time to maturity short-
ens, but even then they are not always traded very frequently. 
Our model, however, can produce (or estimate) short-term real 
rates. Knowing short-term real rates provides a crucial element 
in understanding monetary policy. Comparing actual real rates 
with what Alan Greenspan above termed the equilibrium rate, 
sometimes also called the natural or neutral real interest rate—
gives an idea of whether Fed policy is expansionary or contrac-
tionary. If the Fed sets rates so that the current real interest rate 
is above the natural rate, policy is contractionary, and if below, 
expansionary. If policy calls for tightness or ease, then rates 
must rise or fall. Of course, the natural rate can move around 
with changes in the economy, so the Fed may have to do quite 
a bit of raising and lowering just to stay neutral. Finding the 
real rate is also only half the battle, and probably the easier half 
at that: Policymakers also have to have some idea of what the 
equilibrium rate is.
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A look at the short (one-month) interest rate from the model 
in ﬁ  gure 3 shows several things. Recently, the rate has been 
quite variable, swinging from a plus 7 to a minus 3 percent 
in 2009 alone, and it currently stands deep in negative terri-
tory. Overall, negative rates are uncommon, though not rare. 
They ﬁ  gure most prominently in the period from early 2002 
to late 2004, a period when the Fed was worried about the 
possibility of deﬂ  ation.
Conclusion
Financial markets provide a lot of information about the 
economy and expectations, but sometimes getting what 
you want takes a little bit of work. Our model, at the cost 
of some assumptions and complexity, splits out key com-
ponents of interest rates, which individually often tell more 
about the economy than does the nominal interest rate alone. 
Currently, the model indicates low rates and stable inﬂ  ation 
expectations. Although it is hard to estimate the equilibrium 
rate, the currently low level of the one-month real interest 
rate suggests monetary policy is reasonably accommoda-
tive. Despite this, our model provides some evidence that 
inﬂ  ation is not expected to increase, as longer-term inﬂ  ation 
expectations remain near historic lows, in the neighborhood 
of 2 percent. Furthermore, the low inﬂ  ation-risk premium 
suggests people are reasonably conﬁ  dent that the dangers of 
inﬂ  ation deviating far from their expectations are relatively 
low. 
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